Cashing In: The Political Economy of Constitutional Stability by Frye, Timothy
    
 
 
 
 
 
Cashing In: The Political Economy of 
Constitutional Stability 
This project addresses issues of law and the institutional 
management of violent inter-group conflict. 
Many argue that secure constitutional rules are a key mechanism 
for managing political conflict and ensuring a peaceful transition 
from authoritarian rule, but we have few empirical studies of the 
determinants of constitutional change. This project begins to fill 
this gap by exploring the dynamics of presidential power in 20 
postcommunist countries over the last decade. It asks: why have 
some presidents in the region expanded their powers 
dramatically, while others have not? Presidents in postcommunist 
countries who came to power in competitive elections increased 
their formal powers nine times between 1989 and 1998, with 6 of 
these 9 cases involving violence.  
Initial quantitative results using annual data from 1989-1998 
suggest that the greater the increase in income inequality, the 
more likely an expansion of presidential power. The effects of 
concentrated wealth on expansions of presidential power are, 
however, dependent upon the intensity of threats to the gains of 
the winners and upon the quality of democracy. This finding 
suggests the importance of understanding the interaction of 
political and economic factors on constitutional stability and a 
non-violent transition from authoritarian rule.  
Principal Investigator: 
Timothy Frye, Professor, Political Science 
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